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Abstract
Public schools in Indonesia are widely perceived have better inputs and to be superior
to private schools. Public schools also beneﬁt advantages of high-scoring peer effect as
entry to some junior secondary public schools in urban area is based on national score
test in elementary school. In this paper, I attempt to conﬁrm the perception of superiority
of public school in Indonesia by comparing the yearly earnings of four types of schools
group; Public, Private Secular, Private Islam, and Private Christian. I use a large-scale
longitudinal observation of individual and household level on socioeconomic and health
survey, Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 2000 to estimate the effectiveness junior sec-
ondary education in Indonesia. To correct for sample selection bias, I use the two-step
method proposed by Bourguignon et al. As a result of insigniﬁcant all selectivity bias
coefﬁcients, I use the OLS estimation to calculate the earnings decompositions. The in-
signiﬁcant selection bias coefﬁcients suggest that the OLS estimation is unbiased. I use the
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with Reimers’ decomposition technique to estimate earn-
ing differential between public and three types of private school graduates. The results of
earnings decomposition from OLS estimation, suggest that earning of people who grad-
uate from public school are 25 per cent and 35.2 per cent higher than their counterparts
from private nonreligious and private Islam. On the other hand, student who schooled at
private Christian school enjoys 0.28 per cents higher earnings that public.
JEL classiﬁcation: J31
Keywords: Parent choice; Education; School effectiveness; Earnings; Indonesia
1. Introduction
The superiority of public school over private school in Indonesia is a contrary with the general
perception that private school are better (Cox and Jimenez, 1991; Evans and Schwab, 1995;
1Neal, 1997; Angrist et al., 2002; Newhouse and Beegle, 2006). These ﬁnding are supported by
the evidence on schooling input and students-teacher ratio. According to Strauss et al. (2004)
public schools in Indonesia enjoy higher quality inputs compare to private schools. Newhouse
and Beegle (2006) add that Indonesian public school, particularly junior secondary schools
generally provide more textbooks than in their private counterparts. The education level of
teachers in public school is higher than private. Teacher of public school are less likely to have
a second job. Other factor that may support the advantage of public school is its tuition fees
averagely were higher than private (Newhouse and Beegle, 2006).
However, there are some indicators and evidences that support the common perception of
private school superiority in Indonesia. James et al. (1996) that use ﬁnal examination scores as
an indicator of the effectiveness of school management ﬁnd that elementary private school has
lower cost per students. This ﬁnding concludes that elementary private school is more efﬁcient
to achieve academic performance. Bedi and Garg (2000) that compare the effectiveness of
four type of junior school in Indonesia ﬁnd that individual who studied at non religious private
school earns 75 per cents higher than their publicly counterpart.
In developing countries the evidences are also ambiguous. McEwan (2001) compares aca-
demic achievement of eighth level students in six types of schools: public DAEM1, public cor-
poration, Catholic voucher, Protestant voucher, non-religious voucher, and private non-voucher
schools. McEwan (2001) ﬁnds that average student achieve highest in private non-voucher
schoolscomparetothepublicDAEM.Ontheotherhand, non-religiousvoucherprivateschools
are less effective than public DAEM schools and as effective as corporation schools. Cox and
Jimenez (1991) and Jimenez et al. (1991) ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant advantages in private
school achievement. Those studies compare the standardized cognitive achievement score in
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Tanzania and Thailand to examine the
school type effectiveness. Asadullaha et al. (2007) using a rich data set from rural Bangladesh
ﬁnd that graduates of primary private madrasa Islamic school signiﬁcantly under-perform com-
1DAEM or Departmento de Administracion de la Educacion Municipalis; part of municipal bureaucracy.
2pared to public schools. On the other hand, Lassibille (2001) Using longitudinal data from a
1994 survey of students in Ghana ﬁnd that two type private schools, Christian and Wazazi, are
lessefﬁcientthantwotypes of publicschools, GovernmentandCommunity. Theyalso ﬁndthat
a student with a given characteristics and family background has better cognitive achievement
in either type of public school than in either type of private school.
Most papers that study about school choice and school effectiveness in the education ﬁeld
focus to the relationship between school resources and test scores or cognitive achievement.
Insteadofusingstandardizedtest, manyeconomistsgivemorefocusonearningsasanindicator
of school performance. The opponents of standardized testing argue that the tests are arbitrarily
scaled, does not has lasting effect on student’s knowledge and does not measure the skills that
have economic value. On the other hand, many economists believe that earnings reﬂect the
market value of skills and knowledge that obtained in school (Card and Krueger, 1994).
In this paper, I investigate the effectiveness of public and private schools in Indonesia. I
follow previous papers (Betts, 1995; Bedi and Garg, 2000; Strayer, 2002; Dustmann, 2004) to
use earnings as the indicator for school effectiveness. This is not the ﬁrst paper to examine
the school effectiveness in Indonesia (James et al., 1996; Bedi and Garg, 2000; Newhouse and
Beegle, 2006). However, this paper has different in some features compare to those papers.
Newhouse and Beegle (2006) and also James et al. (1996) use student’s achievement in school
to measure the school effectiveness. Despite this paper has similarity with Bedi and Garg
(2000) that use earnings as an indicator of school performance, however, I do not include some
control variables to the model: such as proxy for quality of school condition; dummy variable
for scholarship. The proxy for school condition2 and dummy variable for scholarships3 are not
appeared in IFLS3.
2The proxy is constructed from question no. DL23 in Book III-4 IFLS1: "What is the major ﬂooring type in
the classroom (now/last school year) ?". Actually, the question no. DL23 is ambiguous since it not speciﬁc to
particular level of school.
3Similar to school condition, the question about scholarships or question no. DL18 in Book III-4 IFLS1:" In
attending school (currently/your last school year) do/did you receive full or partial scholarship? A scholarship
includes a grant from the government or other organization or tuition deduction from the school." does not ask for
speciﬁc level of school
3This paper proceeds in the following direction. In the next section, I present some Informa-
tion on Indonesia’s formal school system. The third section sets about model of school choice
determinants, selectivity bias, and earnings decomposition. The fourth section presents about
sample data that taken from Indonesia Family Life Survey. In the ﬁnal section, I present the re-
sult and interpret several empirical analyses, while the ﬁnal section summarizes and concludes.
2. The Formal School in Indonesia
Based on the National Education System Law No. 20/2003, the formal school system in In-
donesia consist of ﬁve level of formal education system4. The formal school system begins
with two years of kindergarten and follow by the three basic education. The ﬁrst three basic
level are primary, junior or lower secondary and senior or upper secondary education. Primary
education consists of 6 year levels and students start at age 7. Junior secondary consists of
three years education and start at age between 13 and 15. In the beginning of 1990s, instead of
continue to general school, students who have ﬁnished primary school could continue to three
years vocational or pre-professional junior and secondary schools. Senior or upper secondary
education as well as junior secondary has three years level whereas the age cohort in this level
is between 16 and 19 years. At the end of the primary, junior and secondary school, students
have to take the national examination test or called the EBTANAS. Every public school and
some of the elite private schools set some minimum level as the entry requirement.
The highest level is tertiary or higher education that consist of diploma course or an un-
dergraduate degree. These degree are provided by among varieties form of educational institu-
tions: academies, polytechnics and universities. Tertiary level could take between 1 to 4 or 5
years. Afterward, people can continue their education to S2 program or master degree and S3
program or doctoral degree. Both degrees consist of academic and professional path and take
up to 5 years.
4Before 2003, the formal school system consists of four level of education as it had same path as the newest
system excluding the kindergarten level
4Based on sources of funding, these schools are distinguished as public and private schools.
According to Oey-Gardiner (1997), many private schools even funded by the government in
many ﬁnancial form as they have to follow the set government’s rules, regulations, and stan-
dards. Most public schools are secular schools whereas many of private schools are religious
Islam or Christians schools. In primary education most of the school is public school. On the
other hand, starting from junior secondary, the higher the level education is the bigger role of
private sectors in providing education.
It is acknowledged that private schools provide the places for students who cannot fulﬁll the
public school entry test requirements and cannot afford the public school tuition fees. Exclud-
ing a few very good private schools, the qualities of most private schools are poor. According
to World Bank (1998) the private schools are more cost efﬁcient managed, however, also has
lower-quality input. The education of average private school teacher and principle are lower
and availability of textbooks in private school is lower than in public schools.
The formal school system above is managed by The Ministry of Education and Culture
or MOEC (Now, the Ministry of National Education or MONE). On the other hand, there is
religious school system, mostly Islamic that managed by The Ministry of Religious Affairs or
MORA. Around 40 per cent of its curriculum contain to religious teaching whereas the other 60
percent of the curriculum follow the secular formal school that setup by the MOEC. According
to Parker (2008), quality of private Islamic school in Indonesia is regarded as a second class
school. Even the poor condition in Islamic school is also admitted by the Indonesian govern-
ment (Parker, 2008). Frequently, many student end up to choose the Islamic private school as
they fail to pass standard minimum that require by the better-quality, public schools.
Only ﬁve years after the independence, the Indonesian Government has an ambition to
provide 6 years of universal primary education. This commitment is supported by the basic
education law that passed in 1950. However, the signiﬁcant increase of the enrollment rate is
not started until 1970s. The expansion of primary school is a result of a massive project to
build schools across the country through Presidential Instruction (INPRES) that funded by the
5oil boom revenues in 1973. As it is showed on the table 1, the gross enrollments of primary
education rose from 80 in 1970 to 107.0 percent in 1995 and achieve 107.1 in 2005. The gross
enrollment rate in junior secondary education signiﬁcantly increased from 16 percent in 1970
to 65.7 in 1995 and rise to 81.7 percent in 2005.
Table 1: GROSS ENROLLMENT RATES INDONESIAN BASIC EDUCATION, 1995-2005*
Level 1970 1980 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
Primary 80.0 107.0 107.0 109.3 110.1 106.1 107.0 107.1
Junior Secondary 16.0 29.0 65.7 70.3 76.0 79.5 82.2 81.7
Higher Senior Secondary 16.0 NA 42.4 46.4 51.5 50.4 54.4 52.9
* Source: World Bank (2007).
The Government extends the commitment to basic schooling from 6 to 9 years in 1989.
With the ambition to achieve 9 years of the universal schooling by 2010 the Government elim-
inates the junior secondary fees in 1994 (Behrman et al., 2002). However, the secondary en-
rollment rates stay low. For instance, the net enrollment of junior secondary school in 1995
in rural area is only two thirds the levels of that in urban area. The other evidence from 1999
data shows that the enrollment rates of the lowest expenditure group is 43 per cent compared
to 77 per cent of the highest income group (Triaswati, 2000). Behrman et al. (2002) argue that
the government strategy to focus on universal primary education is a reason of low support for
poor people who mostly live in rural area to access the secondary education.
AccordingtoADB(1998), theIndonesianGovernmentonlyspendabout66percentoftotal
education spending as the rest is ﬁnanced by families and additional nongovernment sources.
Most of the school, public or private, charges entrance fees, monthly levies, and sometimes
charge special funds for speciﬁc purposes. These family contributions contribute signiﬁcantly
to ﬁnance non salary expenditures. Since the school fees were abolished in 1994, the family
donation and parent-teacher associations (PTAs) have an important role in funding the public
junior secondary school. Badan Pembantu Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan or BP3 is a form of
6PTA that consist of parents, school principal, teachers and other members from the community.
The major role of BP3 in public school is to raise funds from parents’ donations, whereas, in
private schools, BP3 has bigger roles in school management; such as tuition fees setting and,
hiring-ﬁring principal and teachers.
3. Model
3.1 Earnings Determination and The Determinants of School Choice
Parents of students face number of educational choice. In my model, parents whose their chil-
dren have ﬁnished primary education have to choose a junior secondary education. I assumed
that parents have already decided for send their children to junior secondary school. Parents
have to choose four available type of secondary school; public, private Islam, private secular,
and private Catholic, Protestant and others. The decision of parent regarding their children
education could play an important role in labor market earnings.
A parent of individual i, that having graduated from primary school, has to choose the type
of junior secondary education. The earnings associated with an alternative, along with the
individual’s preferences and ﬁnancial constraints, will determine the value of the alternative to
i. For each alternative, the potential earnings process is
Yij = yj(Xi;ei) j = 1;:::;J; (1)
where Xi is observable individual or family characteristics whereas ei is unobservable char-
acteristics. j is the junior secondary school types. Equation (1) determine that the earnings paid
in the labor market depends on which choice a parent makes. The discounted present value (in-
direct utility) of a particular alternative is
Vij = vj(Zi;yj;Cj;ui) j = 1;:::;J; (2)
7where equation (2) is the present value of the earnings stream that determined by taste and
ﬁnancial constraints Zi, direct and indirect cost to entry school type j and unobserved personal
attributes ui. Individual chooses one of school types j to maximize their utility as in equation
(3)
Vij = max(Vi1;:::;Vij) (3)
With an additional assumption that
(e;u) s g(e;u) (4)
To determined the decision of the individual, the earnings future stream is parametrized into
a geometric growth process. The expected earnings of individual i that choose the alternative
j is
Yij = 0; 0 < t · 1
Yij = ^ yije
gj(t¡sj); sj · t < 1
(5)
where Yij are the yearly earnings of individual i at time t if alternative school type j is
chosen. ^ yij is initial level of earnings whereas g is a growth rate. sj is the time when individual
i entry the labor market and t ¡ sj is the labor market experience.
Follow the model by Bedi and Garg (2000), besides direct cost, for instance transportation
cost, students also face costs of entry. Some public school and also some elite private schools
require a minimum test score on national primary education ﬁnal examination (EBTANAS).
This minimum score could be considered as a type of non price entry selection. Other type of
non price criterion is religion.
Based on these criterions, the equation of cost is
Cij = cj(Oi;¿i); (6)
8Where Oi are observable variables that contain ability, family background and regional
variables whereas ¿i is an unobserved variable. The combination of equation (5) and (6) gener-
ate a net present values. It is assumed that in an inﬁnite horizon, a constant rate of discount for
individual i is ri where ri > gij, in order for this present value to be ﬁnite. Following Willis




















In equation (7) two factors reduce the inﬁnite earnings stream (¹ Yij=[ri ¡ gij]). The ﬁrst is
the wage cost and second, direct and indirect cost of choosing school type j.
The logarithm of NPVij is
NPV
¤ = NPVij = ln¹ Yij ¡ ln(ri ¡ gij) ¡ risj ¡ °jCj (8)
And a Taylor series approximation to the nonlinear term, ln(ri¡gij) produce linear reduced
form of net present value, NPV ¤
NPV
¤ = !0j + !1jln¹ Yij + !2jri ¡ °jCj; (9)
The earnings of individual i at time t¤ = (t ¡ sj), in terms of ¹ Yij and gij, is
lnYij(t
¤) = ln¹ Yij + gijt
¤ (10)
where the rate of wage growth, gij, is a parameter that varies across school type alternatives.
The initial earnings, ln¹ Yij, depends on individual characteristics and family background, Xi.
Where the equation of inital earnings is
9ln¹ Yij = ®0j + ®1jXi + "ij (11)
Hence, the earnings process is
lnYij(t
¤) = ®0j + ®1jXi + "ij (12)
where Xij is observable variables. ®1j is a coefﬁcient vector whereas "ij is error term.
As Bedi and Garg do the school type choice rule could be expressed as
Tj = j if lnYij > max(lnYij)ik; j = 1:::J; k 6= j (13)
where Tj is school indicator. The parameters in equation (12) and parameters in equation
(13) may be yield by estimating a multinomial discrete choice model. The combination of
equatin (12) and (13) deﬁnes a polychotomous logit model where





The equation (14) is a reduced form relationship where reduced school type selection is an
outcome of parental choice as well as the non-price selection criterion that use by schools.
3.2 Earnings and Selectivity Bias
This research on school choice focused on a standard wage equation of the form
lnYij = ¯0j + ¯1jXij + "ij (15)
wherelnYij isthenaturallogarithmofyearlyearningstoanindividualwhostudiedatjunior
secondary school type j. Xij are observed variables which include individual characteristics,
ability, family backgrounds, and regional dummies. ¯1j are coefﬁcients vector of observable
10variables and "ij is error term as it is assumed to be a normally distributed with mean zero and
positive variance.
Similar to Wilis and Rosen (1979) the selection bias problem is consider caused by the
choice school type. The expected value of log earnings in equation (15) illustrates the problem.
The expected log earnings conditional on school choice is
E(lnYij j T = j) = ¯1jXij + E("ij j T = j) (16)
The selection bias may be appeared in equation above if E("ij j T = j) 6= 0 therefore
OLS estimation on equation 15 are inconsistent. Using a two-step procedure that shown by
Lee(1983), the consistent earnings equation could be produced and selection bias can be con-
trolled. The ﬁrst step is estimate the equation (14) by the multinomial logit to determined
school choice. The multinomial logit yield a selectivity correction term as in the second step
this term are included to obtain consistent estimates. After the selectivity is included, the earn-
ings equation becomes
lnYij = ¯0j + ¯1jXij + ½j¸ij + ´ij (17)
where¸ij istheselectioncorrectiontermasitmeasurestheeffectofthenon-randomsorting
of individuals, while the sign indicates the nature of the selection. The positive sign in the
selection term coefﬁcient indicates that unobserved variables that inﬂuence school choice are
positively correlated with unobserved variables that determine earnings.
3.3 Decomposition of Earnings Differential
I use the Blinder-Oaxaca earning decomposition to estimate the difference in earnings between
public and private school graduates. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition originally is used to
check for differences in characteristics between men and women as in Oaxaca (1973). How-
ever, some studies about earnings gap and education also use the decomposition method (for
11instance see Bedi and Garg, 2000; Le and Miller, 2003)
Using Blinder-Oaxaca method the difference in average log earnings offers is
lnYj ¡ lnYk = (Xj ¡ Xk)[D^ ¯j + (I ¡ D)^ ¯k] + [Xj(I ¡ D) + XkD](^ ¯j ¡ ^ ¯k)
(18)
where lnYj and lnYk are the means of the log earnings of school type j (public) and school
type k (privates). Xj and Xk are vector of independent variables for public and privates grad-
uates whereas ¯j and ¯j are the estimated coefﬁcients. I is the identity matrix and D is a
diagonal matrix of weights.
The choice of D as the measures of weight will measures the discriminantion impact. Some
studiesviewthat D = I wheretheyassumedassumptionassumedthatdiscriminationpenalizes
the minority by preventing them from earning according to the majority group’s wage-offer
function. On the other hand, some other studies assumed that D = 0, where they argue that
discrimination gives the preferred group an undeserved advantage, that they are paid more than
they would get in a non-discriminatory world (Reimers, 1983).
In this paper, I use decomposition proposed by (Reimers, 1983). Reimers assumed that
the no-discrimination earnings function lies somewhere between a dicrminatory and a non-
discriminatory world. Therefore Reimers proposed D = (0:5)I for decompositions of the
earnings differentials.
Using the Reimers’ decomposition, the observed earnings differential now become
lnYj ¡ lnYk = (Xj ¡ Xk)[0:5(^ ¯j + ^ ¯k)] + (^ ¯j ¡ ^ ¯k)[0:5(Xj + Xk)] (19)
Furthermore, if the selection bias appears in the model then the log earnings decomposition
become
lnYj ¡ lnYk =(Xj ¡ Xk)[0:5(^ ¯j + ^ ¯k)] + (^ ¯j ¡ ^ ¯k)[0:5(Xj + Xk)]
+ ^ cj¸j ¡ ^ ck¸k
(20)
12where ¸j and ¸k are the correction terms and ^ cj and ^ ck are the estimated coefﬁcients on the
correction term variables.
Some prominent discrimination literature (for instance see Jann, 2008) create an alternative
decomposition result that shows some nondiscriminatory coefﬁcients vectors that has contri-
bution to determine the earnings differences. From the equation (19) Jann (2008) shows that
the two fold decomposition is










where Q is the part of differential of the outcome that is explained by group differences
in the predictors and U is the unexplained outcome differential. U also attributed to discrim-
ination as well as captures all potential effects of differences in unobserved variables. As
correspondence to Reimers method where the average coefﬁcients over both groups, hence the
estimation for the nondiscriminatory parameter vector is
^ ¯
¤ = 0:5^ ¯j + 0:5^ ¯k (22)
4. Data
I use Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 3 year of 2000 to estimate the school choice model
and earnings decomposition of private and public schools graduates in Indonesia. The IFLS is
a large-scale longitudinal observation of individual and household level on socioeconomic and
health survey. The IFLS sampling scheme was formed on provinces, then randomly selected
the samples within provinces. Due to the cost-effectiveness reason the survey had taken only
13 out of 26 provinces on the Island of Java, Sumatra, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan,
and Sulawesi. They were selected as it approximately represents the 83 percents of Indonesian
population. RAND, as the major producer of IFLS has been conducting the forth wave of
IFLS, so called IFLS4. According to RAND website, the public use ﬁles and documentation
13of IFLS4 should be ready by early spring 2009. However, I only use the IFLS3 as I assume
that the paper was conducted when the IFLS4 has not been publicly released. I also aware that
in IFLS2 (1997) the employment data 5 have not been publicly published until now.
Table 2: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES IN SCHOOL-CHOICE AND EARNINGS EQUATIONS
Variable Description
LOGEY Earnings total in a year of 2000
AGE Age in year of 2000
JUNIOR Jr. sec. is the highest level education? yes=1, no=0
SENIOR Senior sec. is the highest level education? yes=1, no=0
HE Higher education is the highest level education? yes=1, no=0
MALE male=1, female=0
ISLAM Religion Islam? yes=1, no=0
NON Religion Non Islam? yes=1, no=0
PRIFAIL Failed in primary school? yes=1, no=0
VILLAGE Live in village at 12 years olds? yes=1, no=0
TOWN Live in small town at 12 years olds? yes=1, no=0
CITY Live in big city at 12 years olds? yes=1, no=0
LANGINDO Do you speak Bahasa Indoensia in daily life? yes=1, no=0
FATHPRIB Highest level education of father is primary education?
yes=1, no=0
FATHJH Highest level education of father is Jr. sec.?
yes=1, no=0
FATHSHHE Highest level education of father is senior sec. or
higher education? yes=1, no=0
MOTHPRIB Highest level education of mother is primary education?
yes=1, no=0
MOTHJH Highest level education of mother is Jr. sec.?
yes=1, no=0
MOTHSHHE Highest level education of mother is senior sec. or
higher education? yes=1, no=0
NSUMARES Reside in North Sumatra? yes=0, no=1
WSUMARES Reside in West Sumatra? yes=0, no=1
SSUMARES Reside in South Sumatra? yes=0, no=1
LAMPUNGRES Reside in Lampung? yes=0, no=1
JAKARTARES Reside in DKI Jakarta? yes=0, no=1
WJAVARES Reside in West Java? yes=0, no=1
CJAVARES Reside in Central Java? yes=0, no=1
JOGJARES Reside in Jogjakarta? yes=0, no=1
EJAVARES Reside in East Java? yes=0, no=1
Continued on Next Page...
5The employment data is located in b3atk1-4 ﬁles.
14Table 2 – Continued
Variable Description
BALIRES Reside in Bali? yes=0, no=1
NTBRES Reside in NTB? yes=0, no=1
KALSELRES Reside in South Kalimantan? yes=0, no=1
SULSELRES Reside in South Sulawesi? yes=0, no=1
NSUMAED Jr. sec. school located in North Sumatra? yes=0, no=1
WSUMAED Jr. sec. school located in West Sumatra? yes=0, no=1
SSUMAED Jr. sec. school located in South Sumatra? yes=0, no=1
LAMPUNGED Jr. sec. school located in Lampung? yes=0, no=1
JAKARTAED Jr. sec. school located in DKI Jakarta? yes=0, no=1
WJAVAED Jr. sec. school located in West Java? yes=0, no=1
CJAVAED Jr. sec. school located in Central Java? yes=0, no=1
JOGJAED Jr. sec. school located in Jogjakarta? yes=0, no=1
EJAVAED Jr. sec. school located in East Java? yes=0, no=1
BALIED Jr. sec. school located in Bali? yes=0, no=1
NTBED Jr. sec. school located in NTB? yes=0, no=1
KALSELED Jr. sec. school located in South Kalimantan? yes=0, no=1
SULSELED Jr. sec. school located in South Sulawesi? yes=0, no=1
OTHERED Jr. sec. school located in Other Province? yes=0, no=1
The initial data set consist of data of respondents who have earnings and are no longer
students. The other restrictions are included excluding of respondents whose education less
than 7 years. Unlike Bedi and Garg (2000), I include the respondents whose education more
than 12 years. The sample data consists of 13,575 respondents who have earnings data. Miss-
ing and miscoded data and also sample restrictions reduce the data set by 12,045 (almost 89
percent) to 1530 observations. Most of the observations, 5,098, are dropped as they had not
proceeded beyond primary school, while 2,861 observations drop since they do not provide
education information. Moreover, I drop 3,468 respondents due to missing information on
parents’ education. The other 892 and 793 respondents also dropped as they do not provide
age information and resident information. Some of the observations also are dropped due to
missing information on location of junior secondary education (793 observations), informa-
tion on religion (3 observations), information whether failed a grade at primary education (13),
15missing information on failed in primary school (1), missing information on the school type
(7).
Table 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS (N=1530)
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I present the means and standard deviation of the variables in table 2 and 3. A description of
the variables that used in the estimation can be found in table 1. I follow Bedi and Garg (2000)
to split all sample to 4 type of group; Public, Private Non Religious (secular), private Islam,
and Private Catholic and Protestant (Christian). There are about 64 percent of the respondents
who study in public school. Public school actually consists of public non religious and public
Islam. I combine the two groups since the number of sample who attends public religious is
very small. On the other hand, the proportion of private secular is 18 percent while the sample
of private Islam ad private Christian are 11 percent and 7 percent. The average yearly earnings
of all sample is Rupiah 10, 2227, 778.258 (or about AUD 12,000) . Whereas the average age
of respondents is 33.865 years, 65 percent is male and 81.8 percent is Moslem. From table
3 that present the descriptive statistics of variables by type of school, the private Catholics
and Protestant (Christian) are more likely to continue to higher education or 27.2 percent.
This data is corresponding to its low probability to discontinue to a higher level of education.
17Probability of public school students to attend higher education is lower than private Christian.
However, the probability is higher than private secular and private Islam. Moreover, public
students have the highest probability to attend senior secondary education as the proportion
is 43.5 percent. Private Islam school students have a lowest probability to continue to senior
secondary and higher education as 49.1 percent of them are discontinue after they get junior
secondary education.
Table 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS BY TYPE OF SCHOOL
Variables Public Private NR Private Islam Private Christian
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
LOGEY 15.451 1.182 15.201 1.213 15.098 1.191 15.479 1.185
AGE 33.951 7.794 32.924 7.953 33.573 7.841 36.078 7.827
JUNIOR 0.316 0.465 0.406 0.492 0.491 0.501 0.311 0.465
SENIOR 0.435 0.496 0.432 0.496 0.357 0.48 0.417 0.496
HE 0.249 0.433 0.162 0.369 0.152 0.36 0.272 0.447
MALE 0.667 0.472 0.626 0.485 0.637 0.482 0.592 0.494
ISLAM 0.843 0.364 0.77 0.422 0.988 0.108 0.437 0.498
NON 0.157 0.364 0.23 0.422 0.012 0.108 0.563 0.498
PRIFAIL 0.209 0.407 0.23 0.422 0.211 0.409 0.184 0.39
VILLAGE 0.550 0.498 0.55 0.498 0.696 0.461 0.447 0.5
TOWN 0.288 0.453 0.223 0.417 0.175 0.381 0.34 0.476
CITY 0.162 0.368 0.227 0.419 0.129 0.336 0.214 0.412
LANGINDO 0.379 0.485 0.371 0.484 0.304 0.461 0.417 0.496
FATHPRIB 0.709 0.455 0.759 0.428 0.801 0.4 0.689 0.465
FATHJH 0.135 0.342 0.144 0.352 0.105 0.308 0.155 0.364
FATHSHHE 0.146 0.354 0.097 0.297 0.082 0.275 0.155 0.364
MOTHPRIB 0.839 0.367 0.881 0.324 0.877 0.329 0.816 0.39
MOTHJH 0.097 0.296 0.061 0.24 0.064 0.246 0.117 0.322
MOTHSHHE 0.056 0.230 0.054 0.226 0.058 0.235 0.068 0.253
URBAN 0.677 0.468 0.716 0.452 0.544 0.5 0.796 0.405
N 978 278 171 103
Parental education is highest for those who study in public and private Christian schools.
The most groups who live in city area when they attend junior secondary school are private
secular and private Christian, whereas private Islam group is the most group who live in the
village area. This data is similar with the proportion of respondents who live in urban-rural
area after they do not study anymore and have income. Most groups who live in the urban area
18are private secular and private Christian.
The respondents of private Islam group are 98.8 percent Moslem. On the other hand there
are 43.7 percent respondents who study in private Christian school. This data could imply
that there is a small religion barrier to attend private Christian school. However, the high
proportion of Moslem students in public and private Islam school does not justify the strong
religion barrier to entry those schools. The quality or the parent expectation could be the
important factor on school choice decision to public or private religious schools.
5. Empirical Result
5.1 School Choice Model Estimation
Before I estimate the earnings differential between public and three types of private school
groups, I estimate polychotomous school choice model that given by equation (14). Follow-
ing some previous studies about earnings decomposition and school choice (Bedi and Garg,
2000; Le and Miller 2003; Newhouse and Beegle, 2005), I use a multinomial logit to estimate
the polychotomous school choice model, instead of OLS, to predict multiple school choice. I
choose this method since school sorting in Indonesia may not be exogenous as the junior sec-
ondary school sorting could be as a result of parental choice and selection criteria that in some
case may implement by the school. Moreover, multinomial logit estimation could overcome
the possibility selectivity bias problem as the student who has higher ability may be more likely
to enter public secondary schools. Following Bedi and Garg (2000), I assume that in making
decision, parents evaluate the beneﬁts of attending each particular school and they faced four
available school types, public (secular and religious), private non-religious (secular), private
Islam and private Catholic, Protestant, and other schools. The school sorting that based on
selection criteria most likely true for public secondary school as they require a certain level of
ﬁnal test score or NEM (Nilai Ebtanas Murni).
Estimates of the multinomial logit of school choice model are presented in Table 4. The
19referencecategoryispublicschool (PUBLIC)whoserepressorcoefﬁcientsaresettozero. Thus
there are three sets of parameters: PRIVATE NR (Private Secular), PRIVATE ISLAM (Private
Islam), and PRIVATE CHRISTIAN (Private Catholic and Protestant).
Table 5: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES OF SCHOOL CHOICE MODEL
Variables Private NR Private Islam Private Christian Public
b/(t) MFX b/(t) MFX b/(t) MFX b/(t) MFX
MALE -0.237a -0.031 -0.235 -0.013 -0.270 -0.010 - 0.053
(0.142) (0.178) (0.226) -
ISLAM -0.477c -0.059 2.812c 0.122 -1.967c -0.173 - 0.109
(0.168) (0.718) (0.218) -
PRIFAIL 0.085 0.015 0.003 -0.000 -0.169 -0.009 - -0.006
(0.166) (0.207) (0.275) -
TOWN -0.193 -0.025 -0.714c -0.045 0.475a 0.031 - 0.039
(0.170) (0.223) (0.254) -
CITY 0.451b 0.073 -0.332 -0.030 0.563a 0.027 - -0.070
(0.180) (0.257) (0.304) -
LANGINDO -0.051 -0.004 -0.286 -0.020 0.083 0.006 - 0.019
(0.146) (0.186) (0.227) -
FATHJH 0.045 0.012 -0.352 -0.024 0.001 0.001 - 0.011
(0.213) (0.284) (0.310) -
FATHSHHE -0.512b -0.060 -0.790b -0.040 -0.278 -0.006 - 0.107
(0.252) (0.350) (0.371) -
MOTHJH -0.465 -0.063 -0.013 0.005 0.093 0.009 - 0.050
(0.298) (0.374) (0.365) -
MOTHSHHE 0.112 0.003 0.701a 0.063 0.026 -0.003 - -0.063
(0.328) (0.415) (0.498) -
CONSTANT -0.671c -3.841c -1.008c -




* T-statistics are in parenthesis and heteroscedasticity consistent
a Signiﬁcance at 10%
b Signiﬁcance at 5%
c Signiﬁcance at 1%
The dependant variables of the model are included gender variable (MALE), control vari-
20able for ability, and family background. Since only 47 of 1530 respondents has the information
about the ﬁnal test score at primary school or NEM, I use "failed in the primary school" (PRI-
FAIL) variable as the proxy for control variable for ability. For family background, ﬁrstly, I use
dummy variables to inform about the type of demographic of the respondents when they were
12 years old (VILLAGE, TOWN and CITY). It is whether they lived in rural area, small town, or
big city. Secondly, I use the parents’ education background (FATHJH, FATHSHE, MOTHJH,
and MOTHSHE) as variables that inform about the socio economic backgrounds.
Religion(ISLAM)playsapowerfulroleinschooltypechoiceasthevariableissigniﬁcantin
all three private school estimations. Muslim respondents signiﬁcantly have lower probability to
enroll in private secular and private catholic and others school. Obviously, Muslim respondents
have higher probability to attend the private Islam school. Gender (MALE) is only signiﬁcant
in private secular school as women have higher chances of going to that school.
The positive and signiﬁcant of coefﬁcient on CITY shows that people who lived in the big
city when they were 12 years have a higher chance of attending private secular and private
Christian and others. The resident in the small town (TOWN) also increases the chance of
attending a private Christian school and on the other hand, reduces the probability of attending
private Islam.
5.2 Selectivity Variable, School Choice, and Earnings
The next step is to estimate the link between school choice and earnings. If students in each
type of school shared the same unmeasured characteristics, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) es-
timation would be unbiased. On the other hand, if parents tend to send their children to a
particular school type as they expected future higher earnings for their children. Thus, the sub-
sample in four school types would not be random draw from the population and OLS would
produce inconsistent estimation.
To conﬁrm whether the sub-sample is random or has selection bias, I use correction sample
selection bias method by Lee (1983) or multinomial logit-OLS two step estimation framework
21for modeling polychotomous choice problem. Technically, I use the stata syntax’s selmlog
that proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007). Bourguignon et al. (2007) create selmlog as a set
of method in Stata on selection bias correction, when selection is speciﬁed as a multinomial
logit (Bourguignon et al., 2007). In addition, I use Lee’s option method in as it is suggested by
many previous literatures (Kingdon, 1996; Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994; Bedi and Garg, 2000;
McEwan, 2001; Al-Samarrai and Reilly, 2006; Meer, 2007).
I present the results of selection-corrected earnings in table 8. The most important results of
selected-corrected earnings in table 8 are the signiﬁcances of selectivity variables or so-called
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). The statistically signiﬁcant selectivity variables are essential as the
results of the estimation are used to decompose the earnings differential based on school type.
All three lambda in three earnings selected corrected estimation are insigniﬁcant. These
evidences, insigniﬁcant selectivity bias coefﬁcients, suggest that ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates would be unbiased, as would an earnings differential decomposition based on OLS
results (Reimers, 1983). The statistical insigniﬁcant of the selectivity effects may partly due
the inclusion of most of the variables from the ﬁrst-step equations (Kingdon, 1996).
Table 5 presents results from the ordinary least square models estimated for each category
of school. The positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on MALE in all groups indicate that man,
given the same levels of education, family background and other control variables, earns on
average higher than woman. In private Islam school group, man earns 91.2 percent higher than
woman whereas in public, private secular and private Christian man earns 50.2 percent, 68.5
percent and 70 percent higher than woman.
The coefﬁcients on variables SENIOR are signiﬁcance in three type of schools: public,
private secular, and private Islam. In public school the coefﬁcient is 0.519 whereas in private
secular and private Islam are 0.351 and 0.708. The coefﬁcient on variable SENIOR for public
school, for instance, means that for given other observable variables, in public school group,
people who has senior secondary education have earnings about 51.9 percent higher than peo-
ple who do not enter the senior secondary school. Moreover, people from private secular and
22private Islam group have earnings about 35.1 percent and 70.8 percent higher than people from
their own group who do not have senior secondary education. The coefﬁcients on variables
HE also signiﬁcant in three type of school public, private secular and private Islam. In pub-
lic school the coefﬁcient is 0.957 whereas in private secular and private Islam are 0.942 and
0.835. The coefﬁcient on variable HE for public school, for instance, means that for given
other observable variables, in public school group, people who continue to higher education
have earnings about 95.7 percent higher than people who do not attend the higher education.
Other individual characteristic variables that have inﬂuence to affect future earnings are
AGE, AGE2, NONISLAM, LANGINDO, and URBAN. Table 5 results suggest that the age and
experience have positive signiﬁcant to group of people from public and private secular school.
For instance, the coefﬁcient on AGE in public school holding other control variable means
that adding one more year of age increases LOGEY or log yearly earnings by 14.5 percent.
The negative coefﬁcients on AGE2 or age squared in public and private Islam group prove that
there are diminishing returns to age in both of school groups. These result is conﬁrmed the
Mincer’s experience-earnings proﬁle. With the assumption a linear relation between earnings
and age of Mincer (1958) suggest that the experience-earnings proﬁle is a concave shape.
Coefﬁcients LANGINDO, NONISLAM, and URBAN are only signiﬁcant in a group of sam-
ple. The coefﬁcient on variable LANGINDO is only signiﬁcant on public school group. In
public school, people who use Indonesian language in daily life have 22.4 percent higher earn-
ings than other people in the same group. Moreover, the positive sign on coefﬁcient on variable
NONISLAM in private Christian school indicates that people whose religion is not Islam earns
56.2 percent higher than Muslim people in the same group. In Indonesia a non-Christian is
allowed to study at a private Christian school. URBAN variable is only signiﬁcant in public
school group. The positive coefﬁcient on URBAN suggest that people who lived in the urban
area earns 14.8 percent higher than people who lived in rural area in public school group.
Some of parent background variables are only signiﬁcant in public and private Christian
23Table 6: OLS EARNINGS REGRESSION EQUATION
Variables Public Private NR Private Islam Private Christian
coeff./ (t-stat) coeff./ (t-stat) coeff./ (t-stat) coeff./ (t-stat)
CONSTANTA 11.738 *** 12.117*** 12.285*** 14.971***
(20.105) (11.026) (7.400) (5.346)
AGE 0.145*** 0.126** 0.086 -0.069
(4.226) (2.280) (0.831) (-0.412)
AGE2 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001 0.001
(-3.623) (-2.326) (-0.742) (0.402)
MALE 0.502*** 0.685*** 0.912*** 0.700**
(6.508) (4.259) (4.609) (2.534)
NONISLAM -0.140 0.166 -0.731 0.562**
(-0.990) (0.611) (-1.004) (2.013)
PRIFAIL -0.055 -0.018 -0.137 -0.065
(-0.672) (-0.108) (-0.699) (-0.180)
LANGINDO 0.224** 0.083 0.243 -0.060
(2.452) (0.379) (0.967) (-0.200)
SENIOR 0.519*** 0.351** 0.708*** 0.215
(6.212) (2.163) (3.605) (0.661)
HE 0.957*** 0.942*** 0.835*** 0.246
(9.783) (4.765) (3.051) (0.657)
FATHJH 0.012 0.267 0.251 0.721*
(0.102) (1.420) (0.853) (1.836)
FATHSHHE 0.096 -0.320 0.164 0.255
(0.856) (-0.867) (0.321) (0.807)
MOTHJH 0.277* -0.093 0.606 0.228
(1.918) (-0.232) (1.556) (0.621)
MOTHSHHE 0.230 0.535 0.411 -0.089
(1.624) (1.365) (0.917) (-0.244)
URBAN 0.148* 0.194 0.323 0.040
(1.836) (1.297) (1.522) (0.143)
Note:
- T-statistics standard errors are in parenthesis and heteroscedasticity consistent
- * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01
school. In public school people whose mother has junior secondary education, ceteris paribus,
earns 27.7 percent higher than other people in the same group. On the other hand, a person
whose father has junior secondary education background earns 72.1 percent income higher
24than other people in the same group.
Table 7: DECOMPOSITION OF EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE SCHOOLS (OLS ESTIMATION)
Private NR Private Islam Private Christian
Earnings Differential 0.250 0.352 -0.028
Decompositions of earnings Differential
Observed Xs (explained differentials) 0.166*** 0.194** -0.317***
(3.44) (2.35) (-2.67)
Observed prices (unexplained differentials) 0.085 0.158 0.289
(1.03) (1.51) (1.89)
EXPERIENCE 0.020 0.007 -0.018
(1.51) (0.48) (-0.79)
SEX 0.024 0.021 0.045
(1.22) (0.73) (1.38)
RELIGION -0.001 -0.063 -0.086
(-0.09) (-1.17) (-1.33)
ABILITY 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.35) (0.06) (-0.29)
LANGUAGE 0.001 0.018 -0.003
(0.26) (1.30) (-0.43)
EDUCATION 0.084*** 0.135*** -0.007
(3.38) (3.80) (-0.29)
PARENTS EDUCATION -0.003 0.026 -0.015
(-0.17) (1.05) (-0.72)
RESIDENT PROVINCE -0.065 0.003 -0.022
(-1.35) (0.05) (-0.21)
SCHOOL PROVINCE 0.104** 0.049 -0.209*
(2.22) (0.93) (-1.65)
TOTAL 0.166*** 0.194** -0.317***
(3.44) (2.35) (-2.67)
Note:
- T-statistics standard errors are in parenthesis and heteroscedasticity consistent
- * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01
255.3 Earnings Differentials
I use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to estimate earnings differential between public and
private school graduates. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in this case explains the log earn-
ings gap into three parts: (i) that due to differences in selectivity bias, (ii) that due to differences
in average characteristics of the groups that attending a particular school type and (iii) that due
to differences in the parameters of the earnings function Reimers (1983). Following Bedi
and Garg(2000), I use Reimers’s decomposition technique where the diagonal of D (matrix of
weights) equals 0.5 as it could avoid the inconsistency in decomposition result.
I use Ben Jann’s Stata routine decompose which allow estimating the decomposition of
earnings differentials in one command. According to Jann (2004): “decompose computes
several decompositions of the outcome variable difference. The decompositions show how
much of the gap is due to differing endowments between the two groups, and how much is due
to discrimination. Usually this is applied to earnings differentials using Mincer type earnings
equations” (Jann, 2004).
Since there is no evidence of signiﬁcant on selectivity bias coefﬁcient so the earnings de-
composition is based on OLS estimation. I presents the result of Blinder-Oaxaca decompo-
sition of OLS estimation between public and private schools in table 6 and 7. A number
important result emerges from this table. First, the public school group earns higher income
than private secular and private Islam group whereas the private Catholic and Protestant group
earns higher than public school group.
The average earnings differential between public school group and private NR group is
0.250 log points. The difference in the observed characteristics or explained differentials is
0.166logpoints. Thestatisticallysigniﬁcantobserveddependentvariablemeansthatthemodel
could explain 66.4 percent of the earnings differential. Whereas the other 0.085 log points or
33.6 percent of gap are unexplained by the variables in the empirical model. There are two
variables that signiﬁcantly construct the earnings gap in between these two groups. With a
gap of 0.104 log points, the dummy variable of province of junior secondary school has a
26strongest inﬂuence to the earnings differential. The second strongest variable is education
whereas public school group enjoy higher yearly earnings as they most likely have higher
education than private secular group.
The earnings differential between public school group and private Islam is 0.352 log points
as the earnings gap between public and private Islam school is larger than the gap between
public and private secular school group. The explained differential between these two school
groups is 0.194 log points or 55.11 percent. On the other hand, there are 44.89 percent unex-
plained differentials by the variables in the model.
Private Christian group have higher yearly earnings than public school group as the gap
is 0.028 log point. Public school group who have dominant ability, characteristics and family
background compare to private Islam dan private secular, have poorer endowment compare
to private Christian group. However, only SCHOOL PROVINCE variable that statistically
signiﬁcant contribute to the gap that is explained by the model. Public school group has -0.209
log points gap in SCHOOL PROVINCE factor.
There are some interesting ﬁndings. First, public school education that has lower average
parent education background still has higher earning that compensate from ability. Second, all
the explained variable are statistically signiﬁcant. This result suggests that the source of the
earnings gap in public-private groups is ability, characteristics and family background. Third,
there are no evidence that there is discrimination in earnings formation based on type of school.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Iinvestigatetheschooleffectivenessandtheeffectofparentalchoiceonearlyeducationtotheir
children’s future earnings in Indonesia. Instead of using academic achievement as the school
effectiveness indicator, I follow major economics research to focus to earnings as the measure-
ment. Earnings are believed by majority of economist as an accurate indicator of market value
on skill and knowledge that obtained in school. Using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with
27Reimers’ decomposition technique, I compare the earnings of student who schooled at 4 types
of junior secondary school: public, private non religious, private Islam, and private Christian.
Controlling for individual characteristics and parents education, the result suggested that public
school students earns 25 per cent and 35.2 percent higher than their private secular and private
Islam counterparts. On the other hand, people who schooled at private Christian earn higher
income than people who studied at public school. These result are contrasting with Bedi and
Garg (2000) as they conclude that that private non-religious schools are more effective than
public. All three earnings decompositions between public and private schools are signiﬁcantly
explained by variables in the model. There is evidence that the strongest signiﬁcant factor that
create earnings gap between public and private secular and Islam school is the individual’s
highest level of education. This ﬁnding could lead to another research question whether the
earnings gap are directly created by the effectiveness of the junior schools or determine by the
choice of senior secondary school or higher education.
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32Table 8: SCHOOL CHOICE AND EARNINGS REGRESSION WITH TWO STEP METHOD
Variables Public Private NR Private Islam Private Christian
Coeff./ (t-stat) Coeff./ (t-stat) Coeff./ (t-stat) Coeff./ (t-stat)
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(6.078) (3.656) (4.191) (2.580)
NONISLAM -0.156 0.320 0.034 0.927
(-0.873) (1.086) (0.026) (0.806)
PRIFAIL -0.055 0.026 -0.133 -0.100
(-0.672) (0.144) (-0.671) (-0.279)
LANGINDO 0.227** 0.076 0.322 -0.035
(2.419) (0.343) (1.129) (-0.110)
SENIOR 0.518*** 0.357** 0.717*** 0.211
(6.193) (2.224) (3.657) (0.636)
HE 0.957*** 0.948*** 0.814*** 0.246
(9.761) (4.780) (2.942) (0.656)
FATHJH 0.015 0.333* 0.356 0.720*
(0.129) (1.669) (0.993) (1.795)
FATHSHHE 0.113 -0.467 0.375 0.234
(0.740) (-1.182) (0.578) (0.763)
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MOTHSHHE 0.221 0.585 0.220 -0.086
(1.427) (1.455) (0.387) (-0.228)
URBAN 0.148* 0.218 0.392* 0.081
(1.843) (1.415) (1.847) (0.269)
LEE1 -0.099
(-0.170)
LEE2 -0.784
(-0.882)
LEE3 0.623
(0.704)
LEE4 -0.427
(-0.325)
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